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Voter preferences and valuation of public goods are often estimated using aggregated votes 
matched with Census data at the same spatial scale. However, this method may yield biased 
estimates for two reasons we examine in this paper: using Census data ignores the selection 
process of who votes, and relying on comparisons between aggregated units makes models 
susceptible to omitted variable bias. To assess bias, we use both Monte Carlo simulation and 
a case study regarding a statewide environmental bond referendum for which we have 
collected aggregate data and individual exit poll data. Our results confirm the two sources of 
bias and show that aggregate model regression coefficients can be incorrect in magnitude and 
even sign. We conclude that using aggregate data will likely lead to incorrect assessment of 
valuation and distributional impacts of public good provision.  
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1  INTRODUCTION  
 Direct democracy plays a critical role in shaping state laws and policies and setting the 
level of local public goods (Matsusaka 2005). In recent years, voters have judged ballot 
questions related to gay marriage, marijuana legalization, Medicaid, and gun rights, and have 
voted on bond and tax referendums worth billions of dollars for environmental protection, 
education, and infrastructure, among others.  
 Many papers have examined determinants of referendum outcomes using publicly 
available, aggregated votes to estimate voter preferences and valuation of public goods. 
Environmental applications are most common in areas such as land conservation (Deacon and 
Shapiro 1975, Kotchen and Powers 2006, Banzhaf et al. 2010), carbon mitigation (Holian and 
Kahn 2015, Anderson et al. 2019), river restoration (Deacon and Schläpfer 2010), and general 
environmental quality (Kahn and Matsusaka 1997, Burkhardt and Chan 2017). Additional topics 
studied include tax restrictions (Cutler et al. 1999), school finance (Brunner and Ross 2010), and 
Medicaid expansion (Matsa and Miller 2018), among others. Official individual vote choices are 
unavailable because of the right to cast a secret ballot, but official aggregated votes by precinct, 
town, or county are widely available. The method of these papers always involves matching 
aggregate votes to Census demographics at the same spatial scale, and then regressing aggregate 
vote approval on Census demographics. These descriptive regression results are interpreted as 
voter preferences by demographic group, and if cost is included in the model the results can 
estimate willingness to pay. Table A1 in the online appendix lists 46 known papers that follow 
this framework.  
 The purpose of this paper is methodological: do regression results using aggregate data 
yield unbiased estimates of voter preferences on specific referendums and valuation of public 
goods more generally? While authors in this literature sometimes acknowledge that aggregation 
bias could be an issue, they never dwell on it and always assume it is minimal.1 However, we 
                                                          
1 Some papers (e.g., Kotchen and Powers 2006) argue that aggregation bias is not problem by citing Fischel (1979), 
who surveys voters in eight, rural New Hampshire towns about a referendum on a paper mill. However, the basis for 
this claim is that Fischel finds mean approval is similar between a survey and the official vote, and thus this is more 
about survey validity than unbiased regression estimates. Alternatively, some papers claim only to be interested in 
an aggregate level, i.e., precinct or town level determinants of approval (e.g., Banzhaf et al. 2010). However, 
omitted variables will still bias estimates in this case. Rarely do papers discuss the selection problem of voter 
participation and that Census population data does not represent the voting population well. Burkhardt and Chan 
(2017) argue that “a referendum is typically posed alongside other referenda as well as elections for public office. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that there is a strong correlation between turnout and voting outcomes for the referendum of 
interest, as many other factors drive voters’ participation decision.” Essentially, they argue that there is no additional 
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find that aggregate model coefficients can be incorrect in magnitude and even sign, and can lead 
to incorrect assessment of valuation and distributional impacts of public good provision. We 
build on prior literature that has identified two sources of bias, but which have not been 
combined nor applied to a valuation setting. First, there may be omitted variables correlated with 
demographic characteristics and approval, and we focus particularly on spatially referenced 
omitted variables, which is an expression of ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950). People sort 
across neighborhoods, and people vote where they live, which means there are likely 
unobservable variables correlated with observable demographics and voter preferences, similar 
to findings in the housing market (Kuminoff et al. 2010). Because aggregate models rely entirely 
on spatial variation, or between-precinct variation, they are more susceptible to omitted spatial 
variable bias than models using individual data, which use both within- and between-precinct 
variation to estimate coefficients. The second source of bias is that aggregate Census population 
data mismeasure the voting population (McDonald and Popkin 2001). The choice to vote is a 
selection problem, and as a result voters are observably different than non-voters, with income, 
age, education, race, and ethnicity all correlated with who shows up to the polls (Leighley and 
Nagler 2013). Using Census population characteristics to proxy for the voting population ignores 
the selection problem and introduces systematic (non-random) measurement error in the 
independent variables.  
We proceed on two fronts to understand the bias of estimating voter preferences using 
aggregate data. First, we develop a Monte Carlo simulation analysis that matches the salient 
structure of individual voting decisions and aggregated precinct records, and compare aggregate 
regression results to truth. Consistent with the problems identified above, the data generating 
process allows for selection in who votes, the presence of spatially omitted variables, and 
varying proportions of within- versus between-precinct variation in demographics. 
Unsurprisingly, spatial omitted variables cause bias; coefficients are downward (upward) biased 
when correlation is negative (positive). In terms of selection bias, when a group is 
disproportionately less likely to vote, the aggregate model regression coefficient for that group 
                                                          
selection issue for a given referendum, which may well be true, but obfuscates the larger point that using Census 
data ignores voter participation selection and does not accurately represent the socioeconomic characteristics of 
voters. Holian and Kahn (2015) actually analyze both individual and aggregate voter data and find substantial 
differences in coefficients between the two models. However, they do not highlight nor seek to explain these 
differences. 
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will be attenuated. If a group is more likely to vote, the coefficient will be amplified. When both 
sources of bias are present, the coefficient bias cannot be signed. In addition, we also model an 
exit poll that samples individual voters at a small subset of precincts. In every case, the exit poll 
outperforms the aggregate model because 1) it controls for voter selection by only including 
voters in the sample and 2) estimates coefficients using individual, within-precinct variation that 
mitigates or eliminates bias from spatial omitted variables. Further, unbiasedness holds even if 
participation in the exit poll is endogenous.  
The second thrust of analysis is a case study of a statewide bond referendum for 
environmental spending that was held in Rhode Island in November 2016. We built precinct-
level, aggregate data by matching precinct approval to socioeconomic information from the 
American Community Survey, which mirrors data construction in prior studies. Given the 
favorable performance of exit polls in the Monte Carlo analysis, we undertook an extensive exit 
poll that we use to benchmark the aggregate data regression results. We enlisted 80 
undergraduate and graduate student volunteers who surveyed at 37 sample precinct locations and 
collected over 2,000 surveys as voters left the polls. Simple means comparisons between the two 
datasets suggest significant differences between the voting and general population, particularly 
among education and income groups, and in directions mostly consistent with the findings of 
Leighley and Nagler (2013). For example, while 37.2% of Rhode Island’s adult population has a 
high school degree or less education, only 13.3% of our exit poll sample was at that education 
level. In addition, we estimate a large degree of within-precinct variation in referendum approval 
and socioeconomic variables. On average, about 95% of variation is within-precinct, meaning 
that aggregate models are using only 5% of total variation to estimate coefficients.  
 We estimate identical models of voter preferences for the bond referendum using the 
aggregate data and the individual exit poll data, regressing referendum approval on presidential 
vote and socioeconomic characteristics (age, education, income, and race). We find large and 
statistically significant differences between the two models. Coefficients on presidential vote are 
substantially different: the aggregate model’s coefficient on Voted for Clinton is 32% larger than 
the individual model, and the aggregate model rejects the individual model’s point estimate with 
over 99% confidence. Further, coefficients on voting for third party candidates are different by 
an order of magnitude. Coefficients on socioeconomic characteristics from the two models can 
differ in magnitude, significance, and sign, and present different pictures of which types of 
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voters support the referendum. For example, the aggregate model indicates that those with 
education levels of high school degree or less and college degree are most likely to support the 
referendum, whereas the individual model suggests it is those with a graduate degree that have 
the strongest support. We estimate additional models that support the two sources of bias being 
present in the aggregate model. First, we are able to find suggestive evidence of the presence of 
spatial omitted variable bias by including additional spatial controls and spatial fixed effects. 
Second, we develop a procedure with the exit poll data that simulates ignoring voter selection, 
and we find evidence that this induced mismeasurement can explain part of the discrepancy 
between the aggregate and individual voter preference estimates.  
 Lastly, in the spirit of Burkhardt and Chan (2017), we estimate willingness to pay (WTP) 
for the environmental referendum and the distribution of WTP across demographic groups. We 
find that estimated WTP is over 2.5 times larger using the aggregate model than the individual 
model. In terms of distributional impacts, sometimes the aggregate and individual results agree 
about which group wins and which loses, but the magnitudes of disparities can be substantially 
different. However, in the cases of educational attainment and race/ethnicity the models disagree 
about the direction of disparate impacts. While with different referendums or different states, the 
direction of bias may be different, these findings demonstrate that estimated valuation derived 
from aggregate voting data are likely to lead to incorrect inferences about overall benefits and 
the distributional impacts of a given policy or proposal.  
This paper significantly advances the literature on empirical estimation of voter 
preferences and valuation through real-world referendum outcomes by demonstrating that 
aggregate data yield biased estimates and why. The underlying causes of the bias have been 
studied separately before. Issues regarding voter turnout and voter selection are well studied 
(Gerber and Green 2000, McDonald and Popkin 2001, Hajnal and Lewis 2003, Leighley and 
Nagler 2013, DellaVigna et al. 2016), though these papers do not examine preferences, only the 
decision to show up at the polls. Ecological fallacy or aggregation bias stemming from spatial 
omitted variables has been studied across many disciplines including political science, 
epidemiology, statistics, and economics (Robinson 1950, King 1997, Firebaugh 1978, Piantadosi 
et al. 1988, Greenland and Morgenstern 1989, Gotway and Young 2002, Banzhaf et al. 2019).2 
                                                          
2 The work in political science on this topic (e.g., King 1997) focuses on cross-level inference, such as estimating 
the number of registered Black voters given the number of registered voters and the number of Black people. 
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However, this is the first paper to recognize both of these issues as possible sources of bias when 
estimating voter valuation using aggregate data. The integration of concepts is critical because 
we find that that the direction of bias cannot even be signed when both sources are present. 
Given the prevalence of these applications and the importance of understanding distributional 
impacts of policy, this is a critical methodological contribution.  
 
2  MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS 
2.1  Description of the Data Generating Process 
We design a data generating process (DGP) that matches the key elements of voting data 
to examine how ignoring voter selection or spatial omitted variables can lead to biased regression 
estimates of voter preferences. There are a total of 𝑁𝑁 people living in 𝐽𝐽 precincts, with the 
population for precinct 𝑗𝑗 denoted 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗. For simplicity, all precincts have the same number of 
people, 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 = 𝑁𝑁/𝐽𝐽. Individuals are indexed by 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. There is a single demographic 
characteristic, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ∈ {0,1}, and the proportion of the population with 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1 is denoted 𝜇𝜇. These 
two groups may not be evenly distributed between precincts, i.e., there may be sorting. The 
degree of sorting is measured by the within-precinct variation, which we label 𝜔𝜔.3 Larger values 
of 𝜔𝜔 imply less sorting (less segregation) and smaller values imply more sorting/segregation.  
Not all people vote, and the non-random choice is dependent on 𝑥𝑥. 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is a binary variable 
that equals one if person 𝑖𝑖 votes. We define the probability of voting for the 𝑥𝑥 = 0 population as  
𝜋𝜋1 = 𝑃𝑃�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 0� ∈ (0,1) and the difference in probability of voting for the 𝑥𝑥 = 1 
population as 𝜃𝜃1 = 𝑃𝑃�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1� − 𝑃𝑃�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 0�.  𝜃𝜃1 > 0 implies 𝑥𝑥 = 1 people are 
more likely to vote than 𝑥𝑥 = 0 people, and 𝜃𝜃1 < 0 the opposite. While the total number of 
people in each precinct is equal, the number of voters may be different across precincts due to 𝜃𝜃1 
and 𝜔𝜔.  
There is a referendum that voters vote on, and there is a latent variable, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∗ , that is 
interpreted as net utility from passage of the referendum. 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, where 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗  is 
                                                          
Robinson (1950) and Cho and Gaines (2004) are critical of the value of aggregate voting data in the context of 
cross-level inference, though Grainer and Quinn (2010) find that a combination of exit poll and aggregate data can 
be optimal under certain circumstances. Another example of aggregation bias research in political science is Gerber 
and Lewis (2004), who find that the influence of the median voter is dependent on within-district heterogeneity, 
which is only uncovered using individual data. These papers do not examine valuation.    
3 Formally, 𝜔𝜔 = 1 − 𝑅𝑅2, and 𝑅𝑅2 comes from the regresion 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, where 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 is a precinct fixed effect.  
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an unobserved variable that is correlated with precinct averages of 𝑥𝑥, defined by the function  
𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 = 𝜌𝜌?̅?𝑥𝑗𝑗 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗, where 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗~𝑁𝑁(0,1), and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎).4 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∗ is unobserved, but the vote choice, or 
approval, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is observed, with 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1 if 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∗ > 0 and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 0 if 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∗ ≤ 0.  
The goal of empirical analysis is to estimate the propensity of the 𝑥𝑥 = 1 group to approve 
the referendum relative to the 𝑥𝑥 = 0 group, which is the relative preferences of the groups. We 
define 𝛿𝛿 = 𝐸𝐸�𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1,𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 0,𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗� as the true measure of those relative 
preferences.  
Regression analysis of aggregate data uses the average approval by precinct for people 
who voted, which we label ?̿?𝑣𝑗𝑗 = ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖∈𝑗𝑗 /∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖∈𝑗𝑗 . Throughout this paper, two bars are used to 
denote averages of the voting population, and one bar is used for averages of the total population. 
At the aggregate level, the demographic characteristics of those who actually voted is not known, 
instead the average value of 𝑥𝑥 for voters and non-voters, ?̅?𝑥𝑗𝑗 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖∈𝑗𝑗 /𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗, is used as the key 
explanatory variable. The aggregate regression model is ?̿?𝑣𝑗𝑗 = 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎?̅?𝑥𝑗𝑗 + 𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗 and has 𝐽𝐽 
observations. 
To simulate an exit poll, a subset of precincts, 𝐽𝐽𝑆𝑆 ∈ 𝐽𝐽, are randomly sampled, with the 
proportion of sampled precincts denoted 𝑝𝑝. Similar to the decision to vote, we allow the decision 
to participate in the exit poll (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗) to be non-random and dependent on 𝑥𝑥. The probability of 
participation for the 𝑥𝑥 = 0 population is  𝜋𝜋2 = 𝑃𝑃�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 0,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1� ∈ (0,1) and the 
difference in probability of voting for the 𝑥𝑥 = 1 population as 𝜃𝜃2 =
𝑃𝑃�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1� − 𝑃𝑃�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 0, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1�.  𝜃𝜃2 > 0 implies 𝑥𝑥 = 1 people are 
more likely to participate in the exit poll than 𝑥𝑥 = 0 people, and 𝜃𝜃2 < 0 the opposite. The exit 
poll survey collects data on 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 from participants, which we assume are accurately 
reported, which is a fairly benign assumption given that exit polls are anonymous and 
confidential.5 The basic regression model resulting from the exit poll data is 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 +
𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 and has ∑𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 observations.  
                                                          
4 This formulation of ecological fallacy is consistent with modeling in other disciplines (e.g., Firebaugh 1978, 
Piantadosi et al. 1988), but instead of calling it omitted variable bias, a correlation between ?̅?𝑥𝑗𝑗 and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∗  is typically 
called group effects.  
5 Further, census data are also self-reported, so any misreporting in exit polls will likely also be present in the 
aggregate data.  
8 
We simulate the DGP under various parameterizations 100 times each in order to assess 
the distribution of coefficient bias present in the two regression models. For each iteration, we 
estimate 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 and 𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, and difference these coefficients from 𝛿𝛿 to calculate bias. All models are 
estimated using OLS, though logit analysis yields 
qualitatively identical findings.  
 For all results presented below, the following 
parameter values are used: 𝑁𝑁 = 250,000, 𝐽𝐽 = 500, 
𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 = 500, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.1, 𝜋𝜋1 = 0.5, 𝜋𝜋2 = 0.05, 𝛽𝛽 = 1, and 
𝜎𝜎 = 2. 𝛼𝛼 adjusts across parameterizations in order to 
ensure that 𝐸𝐸�𝑃𝑃�𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∗ > 0�� = 0.5. The critical 
parameters that we vary are 𝜌𝜌, 𝜇𝜇, 𝜔𝜔, 𝜃𝜃1, and 𝜃𝜃2, 
which appear in the text box for reference.6 
 
2.2  Assessing the role of spatial omitted variables  
 The critical parameters for understanding spatial omitted variable bias are 𝜌𝜌, which is the 
parameter that sets 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�𝑥𝑥𝚥𝚥� ,𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�, and 𝜔𝜔, the proportion of within variation. We set 𝜇𝜇 = 0.2, but 
other values produce similar results, and we set 𝜃𝜃1 = 0 and 𝜃𝜃2 = 0 in order to focus solely on the 
problem of omitted variables for now.   
 Figure 1 displays two plots of estimated biases for the two estimators. The left panel 
contains simulations with a large proportion of within-precinct variation, 𝜔𝜔~95%, and the right 
panel contains less, 𝜔𝜔~80%. These values were chosen based on the ranges observed in the exit 
poll data (explained below in Table 1). The vertical axis of each plot measures coefficient bias 
and the horizontal axis is different values of 𝜌𝜌, ranging from large negative to large positive.  
For the aggregate model, the results are similar across plots; downward bias occurs when 
there is negative correlation and upward bias occurs when there is positive correlation. Further, 
the magnitude of bias grows with the magnitude of correlation. This finding is hardly novel, as it 
is consistent with standard omitted variable bias, in which bias is determined by the sign and 
strength of correlation and the coefficient on the unobserved variable. More novel, however, and 
specific to aggregation, we see that as the within-precinct variation decreases (moving from the 
                                                          
6 Simulation code is available by request. 
Important Simulation parameters 
𝜌𝜌 Sets correlation between 
spatial omitted variable and 
precinct mean demographics 
𝜔𝜔 Proportion of variation in 𝑥𝑥 
that is within-precinct  
𝜇𝜇 Proportion of the population in 
𝑥𝑥 = 1 group 
𝜃𝜃1 Differential rate of voting for 
𝑥𝑥 = 1 group 
𝜃𝜃2 Differential rate of exit poll 
participation for 𝑥𝑥 = 1 group 
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left panel to the right), the variance of estimates decreases, so in essence the aggregate model is 
more consistently biased, though the magnitude of bias is unchanged. This occurs because as 
between-precinct variation increases, the more variation the aggregate model is able to use for 
estimation and the more precise the estimates become.  
For the individual exit poll model, in addition to 𝜌𝜌, bias depends on the amount of within 
variation. In the left panel, there is no visual evidence of bias, though it does exist, but is very 
small in magnitude, with the sign of bias following that of the aggregate model. However in the 
right panel, the magnitude of bias increases, but is still four to five times smaller than the bias of 
the aggregate model. The intuition behind these results is that the exit poll model is able to use 
within-precinct variation for estimation, and this variation is less correlated with the unobserved 
variable than the between-precinct variation, �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�𝑥𝑥𝚥𝚥� ,𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�� > �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�� > 0. As the 
within-precinct variation declines, the �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ,𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�� increases and the exit poll bias increases. 
When all variation is between-precinct, meaning absolute segregation, then aggregate and 
individual model have equal bias.7  
 
2.3  Assessing the role of voter selection  
 The aggregate model ignores voting participation selection and assumes that all people 
are equally likely to vote, and thus population demographic averages equal voter demographic 
averages. The critical parameters for understanding how this assumption may lead to bias are 𝜇𝜇, 
the proportion of the population with 𝑥𝑥 = 1, and 𝜃𝜃1, the differential rate of voting for those with 
𝑥𝑥 = 1. For all iterations, we set 𝜌𝜌 = 0 and 𝜃𝜃2 = 0 to isolate the problem of mismeasurement. We 
set 𝜔𝜔~80%, but other values produce similar results.  
 Figure 2 presents two panels: the left sets 𝜃𝜃1 = −0.2 and the right sets 𝜃𝜃1 = 0.2. The 
vertical axis of each plot measures coefficient bias and the horizontal axis is different values of 
𝜇𝜇, ranging from 0.2 to 0.8.  
 For the aggregate model, the left panel shows that when the 𝑥𝑥 = 1 group is less likely to 
vote, 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is biased downwards when the 𝑥𝑥 = 1 group is less than half of the population and is 
                                                          
7 While a spatial omitted variable is the focus here (consistent with prior ecological fallacy literature), there may also 
be an individual-level omitted variable. The online appendix explores this and finds that the aggregate model and 
exit poll model are equally biased in this case. In real applications, votes for president and a large number of 
socioeconomic variables are included in the regression model, thus individual-level omitted variables seems 
unlikely. 
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biased upwards when the 𝑥𝑥 = 1 group is more than half of the population. The right panel shows 
the opposite pattern: when the 𝑥𝑥 = 1 group is more likely to vote, 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is biased upwards 
(downwards) when the 𝑥𝑥 = 1 group is less (more) than half of the population. The sign of bias is 
dependent on the sign of 𝛿𝛿. Since 𝛿𝛿 is positive in these results, downward bias is attenuation bias 
and upward bias is amplification bias. Figure A2 in the online appendix presents results for a 
negative 𝛿𝛿, and the sign of bias is flipped from what appears in Figure 2.  
 The intuition behind these results stems from understanding how variance changes with 
the systematic measurement error created by ignoring selection. For the aggregate model, 
𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣(?̅?𝑥𝑗𝑗 , ?̿?𝑣𝑗𝑗)/𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶(?̅?𝑥𝑗𝑗). The true proportion of 𝑥𝑥 = 1 population voting is denoted ?̿?𝑥𝑗𝑗, and 
thus we can define the aggregate regression coefficient without a mismeasured voting population 
𝛿𝛿′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣(?̿?𝑥𝑗𝑗 , ?̿?𝑣𝑗𝑗)/𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶(?̿?𝑥𝑗𝑗). When 𝜇𝜇 is small, positive values of 𝜃𝜃1 compress the variance of 𝑥𝑥 
and compress the covariance of 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑣𝑣, but less, such that 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶�?̿?𝑥𝑗𝑗� − 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶�?̅?𝑥𝑗𝑗� > 𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣�?̅?𝑥𝑗𝑗 , ?̿?𝑣𝑗𝑗� −
𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣�?̿?𝑥𝑗𝑗 , ?̿?𝑣𝑗𝑗�, which means that 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 > 𝛿𝛿′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎. When 𝜇𝜇 is large, positive values of 𝜃𝜃1 expand 
variance and 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 < 𝛿𝛿′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎. Similar logic applies to the case of 𝜃𝜃1 < 0. Figure A3 in the online 
appendix demonstrates the compression and expansion of variance for different values of 𝜇𝜇 and 
𝜃𝜃1. 
Results for the individual model indicate no bias for any parameterization of 𝜇𝜇 and 𝜃𝜃1 
because the exit poll sample comprises only voters and thus accounts for voter selection.  
 
2.4  Combined effects of spatial omitted variables and voter selection 
 While Sections 2.2 and 2.3 examined sources of bias individually, we now combine the 
two sources, which is more likely to reflect actual data and applications. Figure 3 explores 
coefficient bias in the aggregate model and presents two panels: the left sets 𝜇𝜇 = 0.2 and the 
right sets 𝜇𝜇 = 0.8. The vertical axis of each plot measures coefficient bias and the horizontal axis 
is different values of 𝜃𝜃1 ∈ {−0.2, 0, 0.2}. Three different values of 𝜌𝜌 are plotted (-0.4, 0, 0.4).  
 Figure 3 illustrates that bias cannot be signed when both sources of bias are present. 
When working with real data, researchers could measure 𝜇𝜇 and gather additional data to 
approximate 𝜃𝜃1, and based on results in Section 2.3 could sign coefficient bias if voter selection 
was the only source of bias. Similarly, if a researcher had intuition about the sign of 𝜌𝜌, though 
unobserved by definition, then based on results of Section 2.2 they could sign coefficient bias if 
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spatial omitted variable bias was the only source of bias. However, Figure 3 makes clear that just 
knowing the sign of each individual source of bias does not necessarily allow a researcher to sign 
the overall bias. The magnitudes of these two sources matter critically when they differ in sign, 
and the magnitudes are unobservable. Thus, in real applications, aggregate data will not only 
yield biased coefficients, but the bias may be of unknown sign or magnitude.  
 
2.5  Exit poll participation selection  
 The exit poll relies on voluntary participation of voters. We now examine how selection 
into participation affects bias. The critical parameter is 𝜃𝜃2, the differential rate of exit poll 
participation for those with 𝑥𝑥 = 1. For all iterations, we set 𝜌𝜌 = 0 and 𝜃𝜃1 = 0 to isolate this 
selection problem. We set 𝜔𝜔~80% and 𝜇𝜇 = 0.2, but these choices are inconsequential.  
 Figure 4 presents results. The vertical axis measures coefficient bias and the horizontal 
axis is different values of 𝜃𝜃2, ranging from -50% to 50%. The figure demonstrates zero bias in 
the exit poll coefficient, even in fairly extreme cases of one group being 50% more or less likely 
to take the survey. Intuitively, the regression compares mean approval across groups, and this 
quantity does not change if the size of one group gets bigger or smaller. The statistics that do 
suffer are estimates of voter participation by group and estimates of the referendum outcome. 
Applying sample weights based on measured versus actual vote outcomes can mitigate this. 
However, in the context of preference estimation, this imprecision is not as important as the 
regression coefficients.  
 In the online appendix, we additionally examine the cases of exit poll participation being 
correlated with approval and being correlated with an omitted variable that is also correlated with 
approval. Both of these variants also indicate zero bias in the exit poll coefficients.  
Summarizing the simulation results, in all cases we consider, the exit poll always 
performs at least as well as the aggregate model in terms of estimating unbiased voter 
preferences, and outperforms the aggregate model in most cases, including those that have 
realistic parameterizations.  
 
3  CASE STUDY DATA  
The case study focuses on a 2016 Rhode Island statewide bond referendum called the 
Green Economy Bonds (GEB). If approved, GEB would authorize the state to raise $35 million 
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through bond sales with proceeds to be allocated for a suite of environmental priorities, including 
land conservation, brownfield remediation, stormwater pollution prevention, and bike paths. 
Bond repayment is financed through general revenue, which is primarily state income taxes and 
sales taxes. GEB passed with 67.6% approval, and 58.0% of the voting age population 
participated in the election. The goal of the empirical analysis is to estimate relative voter 
preferences of various partisan and socioeconomic groups for GEB.  
 
3.1  Aggregate Data 
 From the Rhode Island Secretary of State, we obtained official vote tallies for GEB and 
the presidential race by precinct, of which there are 416. We also downloaded socioeconomic 
data at the Census block group level from the American Community Survey 2013-2017. From 
rigis.org, we downloaded a 2016 precinct shapefile, which we then overlaid with the block group 
shapefile to calculate area weights, which were then used to calculate the approximate 
socioeconomic mix for each precinct. This construction replicates the method of other research 
using aggregate data (e.g., Kotchen and Powers 2006, Banzhaf et al. 2010), though many papers 
use units of analysis larger than precincts.  
 We estimate the following descriptive regression model, which mirrors prior research: 
?̿?𝑣𝑗𝑗 = 𝑷𝑷�𝒋𝒋𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏 + 𝑿𝑿�𝒋𝒋𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐 + 𝒁𝒁𝒋𝒋𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗         (1) 
?̿?𝑣𝑗𝑗  is the proportion of voters voting yes on GEB in precinct j, and 𝑷𝑷�𝒋𝒋 is a vector of the 
proportions of voters voting for presidential contenders. Consistent with notation in Section 2, 
we use the double bar on these two variables to indicate a mean of the voting population. 𝑿𝑿�𝒋𝒋 is a 
vector of socioeconomic characteristics, each defined as the proportion of the population that is a 
given age, education level, gender, etc. A single bar is used here to denote that the average 
includes non-voters. The coefficients of interest are 𝜷𝜷�𝟏𝟏 and 𝜷𝜷�𝟐𝟐, which give the relative 
propensities of various partisan and socioeconomic groups to vote in favor of GEB. 𝒁𝒁𝒋𝒋 is a vector 
of location characteristics that may influence voting on GEB. Specifically, we include population 
density, 2016 residential property tax rate, average house sales price, acres preserved by state 
funds within 2km of precinct, precinct centroid distance to an existing bike path, and the number 
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of remediated brownfields.8 Equation (1) is estimated by weighted least squares, with precincts 
weighted by the total number of votes for GEB officially recorded. 
 
3.2  Exit Poll 
We designed an exit poll survey to elicit votes for GEB and president and several 
socioeconomic characteristics (age, gender, race/ethnicity, income, education, and homeowner 
status).9 All questions were multiple choice or yes/no, and age, income, and education questions 
intentionally used ranges that matched ranges of ACS variables to enable comparison.   
To implement the exit poll, we recruited 80 undergraduate and graduate student 
volunteers and placed them at 37 polling locations around the state for full day shifts. We chose 
sample poll locations to be representative of the state’s socioeconomic characteristics, 
partisanship, and geographic scope. The online appendix provides additional details on the 
selection of sample precincts. While voters could vote early or by mail, there were significant 
hurdles to these options in Rhode Island in 2016, and only 8.5% of ballots cast were done in 
these ways. 
Pollsters approached voters about survey participation as they were leaving the poll. The 
survey was completely anonymous and self-administered, which should mitigate social 
desirability bias. Pollsters reported an estimated 50% response rate. On Election Day, a total of 
2,033 surveys were completed, which is the sample we use for analysis.  
 We estimate the following model, which is the individual analogue of Equation (1): 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊𝒋𝒋𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏 + 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒋𝒋𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐 + 𝒁𝒁𝒋𝒋𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗       (2) 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is binary and equals one if voter i in precinct j voted to approve GEB, 𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊𝒋𝒋 is a vector of 
binary variables for presidential vote, 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒋𝒋 is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics. As in 
Equation (1), 𝜷𝜷�𝟏𝟏 and 𝜷𝜷�𝟐𝟐 are the coefficients of interest. We estimate Eq. (2) using weighted least 
squares, with individual sampling weights determined by a person’s votes for GEB and president 
(described below).  
                                                          
8 See the online appendix for details on these data.  
9 An alternative source of individual data is a phone or internet survey, which is used for predictive election polling 
(e.g., CNN, Pew) and by some academic research. However, if the research question is explicitly about voters, exit 
polls have an advantage because the sample is necessarily all voters. With other methods, it is necessary to generate 
a likely voter model, which is often inaccurate (Rogers and Aida 2014). Further, which voters respond to phone or 
internet surveys can change over time leading to inaccurate conclusions (Gelman et al. 2016). 
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3.3  Summary Statistics 
Table 1 provides means of voting and socioeconomic variables for both data sets. 
Column 1 presents means for the aggregate precinct data, which comprises the entire state of 
Rhode Island. The state leans liberal: GEB passed handedly with 67.6% approval, and Hillary 
Clinton received 54.1% to Donald Trump’s 39.2%. About two-thirds of residents are 
homeowners, just over half are female, and 18.8% are Hispanic or Black. The age distribution is 
fairly even. The income distribution shows a large mass of high earners, with 33.3% of 
households having an income above $100,000. In terms of education, just over one-third of the 
adult population is a high school graduate or dropout, 26.4% have some college, 21.5% graduate 
college, and 14.9% have a graduate degree. Column 2 gives means for just the 37 precincts that 
we sampled for the exit poll. These precincts mirror the state as a whole well, which was our 
intention in choosing sampling locations.  
Our exit poll sample voted disproportionately for Clinton and for GEB relative to their 
precincts, with 63.3% for Clinton and 81.7% approval of GEB. Correlation between partisanship 
and exit poll participation is consistent with prior research (Best and Krueger 2012). Given the 
results of Section 2.5 and the additional analysis in the online appendix, this selection is not a 
concern for estimating unbiased preferences. However, it does mean that demographic averages 
of the exit poll sample may not accurately reflect the averages of all voters in those precincts. To 
mitigate this inaccuracy, we calculate individual sampling weights that correct for the differential 
probability in exit poll participation. The weights equate voting percentages for the sample with 
the official results for the sampled precincts. Effectively, this gives a weight of less than one for 
those who voted for GEB or Hillary Clinton and a weight greater than one for those who voted 
against GEB or for Donald Trump, but also calculates a weight for every GEB-presidential vote 
combination. Given the correlation between demographics and vote choices, the weighted means 
provide a better estimate of the voting population characteristics.  
Column 3 of Table 1 presents weighted means for the exit poll sample, and Column 4 
presents differences in means between the exit poll and the population estimates of sampled 
precincts (Column 2). Differences in mean for the various votes cast are effectively set to zero 
through the application of weights, but even after weighting there are large differences in many 
of the socioeconomic variables. Individuals in households earning less than $30K are 8.8 
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percentage points less likely to be present in the exit poll sample than the population at large, 
whereas those coming from households earning $50-74K are 6.9 percentage points more likely to 
be present. The largest disparities in propensity to vote is seen by education level. Those with a 
high school degree or less are 21.8 percentage points less likely to be present in the exit poll 
sample, while those with a college or graduate degree are 9.2 percentage points more likely to be 
present.  
The large disparities observed in Column 4 are a function of the selection process of who 
votes and the selection process of who responds to our survey. Leighley and Nagler (2013) 
document that the propensity to vote increases with age, income, and education. Because 
Column 4 patterns are consistent with these findings and we have applied weights to correct for 
uneven exit poll participation, we argue that Column 3 fairly accurately represents the voting 
population. Hence the large disparities observed in Column 4 suggest that the aggregate precinct 
data does not accurately measure the voting population. We can return to the Monte Carlo 
simulation results to assess coefficient bias in the aggregate model from mismeasurement alone. 
The Monte Carlo results indicate that the further the number in Column 4 is from zero and the 
further the number is in Column 2 from 50, then the larger the bias is, and the bias will be 
attenuation or amplification based on the sign in Column 4 and whether Column 2 is greater than 
or less than 50. For example, we would expect the aggregate model coefficient on household 
income less than $30K and education level high school or less to be attenuated because both 
groups comprise less than half the population and are less likely to vote. On the other hand, the 
aggregate model coefficients on household income $50-74K, education level college graduate 
and education level graduate degree are expected to be amplified because these groups comprise 
less than half the population and are more likely vote.  
However, the bias predictions based on ignoring voter selection may not hold because the 
second source of bias, omitted spatial variables, may disrupt those patterns, as shown in Figure 3. 
While we of course cannot present statistics on possible omitted variables, one key element 
determining the consistency of bias in the aggregate model and the amount of bias in the 
individual exit poll model is the amount of within-precinct variation. Column 5 presents this 
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statistic for each variable derived from the exit poll.10 For all age and education groups, within-
precinct variation is above 95%. For middle income groups, it is over 97%, while it is 92% for 
less than $30K and 90% for over $100K. Even for presidential votes within-precinct variation is 
large at 90%, which is surprising given widespread evidence of sorting and polarization (e.g., 
Card et al. 2008, Lang and Pearson-Merkowitz 2015). We see the most sorting for Hispanic and 
Black, but still 77% of variation is within precinct. The second lowest is for homeowners at 86% 
within.  
Given the high degree of within-precinct variation, we expect most variables in the 
individual exit poll model to be relatively immune from omitted spatial variable bias. Further, 
these numbers establish how little of the total variation is used for estimation in the aggregate 
model.  
 
4  CASE STUDY RESULTS 
Table 2 presents voter preference regression results for both datasets. For both columns, 
the coefficients are interpreted the same: the percentage point change in likelihood of voting for 
GEB resulting from a one percentage point increase in that variable. For age, income, and 
education, which all have multiple categories, the omitted category is chosen as the one with the 
smallest difference between population mean and exit poll mean in order to minimize the bias 
affecting the omitted group.11 Precinct characteristics (𝒁𝒁𝒋𝒋) are included in both models, but not 
displayed.  
 Coefficients are considerably different across datasets. Consider first the coefficients on 
presidential voting. The coefficients on Voted for Hillary Clinton are both large, positive, and 
precisely estimated, implying that Democrats prefer environmental spending more than 
Republicans. However, the aggregate model coefficient is 32% larger than the individual model, 
and the point estimate from the exit poll would be rejected with over 99% confidence by the 
aggregate model. Coefficients on votes for third-party candidates are even more disparate across 
                                                          
10 Ideally, this would be measured at the population level. However, Monte Carlo evidence suggests that exit poll 
estimates of within-precinct variation are good approximation of population within-precinct variation, even in the 
presence of differential voting participation rates by groups. 
11 If bias resulting from ignoring voter selection (mismeasurement of voter characteristics) affects the omitted group, 
then all estimated coefficients that are relative to that group will also be biased even if there is no mismeasurement 
for the other groups. For income, we use over $100K as the omitted group even though the difference in means is 
slightly larger than $30-49K because proportion of population with income over $100K is over twice as large as 
$30-49K and standard errors are smaller as a result. 
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models. The aggregate model finds that Gary Johnson supporters are 46 percentage points more 
likely to vote for GEB than Trump voters, a similar margin as Clinton voters. However, the 
individual exit poll finds that Johnson voters are equally likely to vote for GEB as Trump voters, 
which is more intuitive given ideological stances of candidates and libertarians beliefs in small 
government. The aggregate model coefficient on Voted for Jill Stein is over 100 percentage 
points larger than the individual model and is implausible when interpreted as an individual 
preference: one vote for Jill Stein leads to 1.2 votes for GEB. Votes for alternative candidates are 
especially susceptible to omitted spatial variables because of how little between-precinct 
variation exists (less than 2% of total variation).  
 Socioeconomic characteristics yield different coefficients across models too. The 
coefficients on homeowner are both negative and highly significant, but the individual model 
coefficient is nearly twice as large in magnitude and the point estimate would be rejected with 
99% confidence by the aggregate model. The aggregate model coefficient on Age 65 or over 
is -0.079 and is statistically significant, but the individual model yields an insignificant 
coefficient of -0.023. The aggregate model coefficients on income less than $30K, $30-49K, and 
$50-74K are all negative and statistically significant, whereas no such pattern emerges in the 
individual model. The models also paint a very different picture in terms of preferences of people 
with different education levels. The aggregate model suggests that people with a high school 
degree or less and those with a college degree are more likely to vote for GEB than those with 
some college, but the coefficient on graduate degree is statistically zero. In complete contrast, the 
individual model indicates that those with a graduate degree are more likely to approve GEB, 
and the coefficients on high school degree or less and college degree are statistical zeros.  
 There are no other papers that execute the same type of analysis with both aggregate data 
and individual exit poll data, so a comparison of these results to prior literature is difficult. The 
most similar is Holian and Kahn (2015) that analyzes both aggregate voting data and an 
individual telephone survey, with both focused on two statewide referendums in California. 
While the authors interpret the results as corroborating each other, there are strong differences 
across datasets and some of the same trends appear as in this paper. For example, Holian and 
Kahn find that both data sets yield coefficients on presidential vote that are the same sign and 
both highly statistically significant, but the coefficient on voting for Bush in the aggregate model 
is 200% larger than the corresponding coefficient in the individual model for one referendum, 
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and 50% larger for the second referendum. Further, almost all coefficients (e.g., income, race and 
age) change sign or significance or have a large change in magnitude across models. In a 
different context, Thalmann (2004) and Bornstein and Lanz (2008) analyze voter preferences on 
the same three Swiss referendums, but do so with different data. Thalmann uses an individual 
survey and Bornstein and Lanz use official precinct votes matched with Census data. The two 
datasets do not agree about estimated preferences for different age groups and language groups. 
A third point of comparison is Wu and Cutter (2011), who also examine voting on multiple 
California referendums. They estimate models at different levels of aggregation (block group, 
tract, county), and find large differences in coefficients across models, which they interpret as 
aggregation bias. Vossler and Kerkvliet (2003) actually find similar results using individual 
survey data and aggregate voting data, but they make an important methodological choice. 
Instead of relying on Census data in the aggregate model, they use the individual survey and 
additional data from individual voters to construct the precinct-level demographic means, which 
essentially eliminates the voter selection issue. 
 Table 2 establishes differences in the preference estimates of the two datasets. The online 
appendix presents several additional specifications, including using a logit model instead of 
linear probability model, and results are robust throughout. The following two sections seek to 
further establish that omitted spatial variables and voter selection are sources of bias in the 
aggregate model.  
 
4.1  Assessing the role of spatial omitted variable bias 
We cannot directly test for the presence of spatial omitted variables by definition. 
Instead, we indirectly test for their presence by examining how coefficients change as various 
spatial variables are included. If coefficients do not change as spatial variables are included, then 
we judge the role of spatial omitted variable bias to be minimal.  
Table 3 Columns 1-4 presents four different specifications using the aggregate precinct 
data. Column 1 includes only presidential votes and socioeconomic characteristics as 
independent variables, Column 2 adds precinct characteristics (this is the main specification from 
Table 2), Column 3 adds town fixed effects, and Column 4 adds quadratic functions of latitude 
and longitude of precinct centroids.12 Looking across columns at coefficients on presidential 
                                                          
12 Rhode Island has 39 towns, with an average of 10.7 precincts per town, and the median town has 7 precincts.  
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votes, there are small increases in the coefficients on Hillary Clinton and Gary Johnson as spatial 
covariates are added. The coefficients on Jill Stein and Other both increase substantially when 
town fixed effects are included. The coefficients on Homeowner and Age 65 or over decline in 
magnitude somewhat, but maintain their statistical significance as spatial variables are added. 
The largest changes are observed in the household income and education level variables. 
Coefficients on income less than $30K, income $30-49K, income $50-74K, high school 
education or less, and college degree all sharply decline in magnitude and lose significance when 
town fixed effects are included.  
These large changes observed in several variables suggest that the aggregate model 
independent variables are correlated with unobserved spatial variables. Particularly when town 
fixed effects are included, we see large changes in coefficient magnitudes and statistical 
significance. However, we see mixed evidence of whether adding spatial covariates moves 
aggregate coefficients closer to the individual coefficients. Income and education coefficients 
that are statistically significant move towards their individual model counterparts, but they also 
move towards zero, so the shift could merely reflect a reduction in the variance available for 
estimation. Further, the coefficient on graduate degree does not move at all, and the homeowner 
and presidential vote coefficients move further away. Thus, adding spatial controls is not a 
panacea and aggregate coefficients remain biased even with that addition.13  
Table 4 presents results from the individual model in the same vein as Table 3. Four 
specifications are given, with each column beyond the first adding spatial control variables. 
Column 1 includes only presidential votes and socioeconomic characteristics as independent 
variables. Column 2, which replicates Table 2 results, adds precinct characteristics. Column 3 
adds town fixed effects, and Column 4 adds precinct fixed effects. Hence, Column 4 uses 
entirely within-precinct variation to estimate coefficients. In contrast to Table 3, the results show 
little change in coefficient magnitudes across columns and only one instance of lost statistical 
significance. These results are intuitive because of the large proportion of variation that is 
within-precinct, and hence not susceptible to spatial omitted variable bias. Additionally, the 
                                                          
13 Brunner et al. (2011) and Altonji et al. (2016) examine multiple, similar statewide referendums and essentially 
construct panel data with repeated observations by Census tract and include tract fixed effects in their regressions. 
Anderson et al. (2019) use changes in vote shares across two referendums to examine how changes is referendum 
design affects approval. These strategies may alleviate some bias caused by omitted variables.  
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results support the Monte Carlo findings that for high levels of within-precinct variation, the 
individual exit poll model is unlikely to be biased by spatial omitted variables.  
 
4.2  Assessing the role of voter selection 
 The aggregate model ignores the selection process of who decides to vote and in doing so 
mismeasures voter characteristics. In this section, we first present evidence of how 
mismeasurement of voter characteristics can cause biased coefficients by inducing 
mismeasurement in the exit poll data. Second, we test whether a simple adjustment of population 
characteristics in the aggregate model can reduce bias.  
 Using the individual exit poll data, we develop a procedure that induces systematic 
measurement error so that the demographic means of the exit poll sample match the Census 
population. For individuals with characteristics that are over- or under-represented among voters 
relative to the total population, we randomly reassign those individuals’ characteristics until the 
sample mean equals the population mean. For example, relative to the general population, voters 
are more likely to have a college degree or graduate degree and less likely to have a high school 
degree or less. We randomly and iteratively assign sampled voters that have a college degree or 
graduate degree to instead have only a high school education until the proportions among voters 
and general population are the same across all education levels. We do the same reassignment for 
age, income, homeowner, female and Hispanic or Black. After reassignment, we estimate the 
main individual exit poll regression model from Table 2. We repeat the process of randomized 
reassignment and estimation 100 times in order to estimate a distribution of the coefficients with 
induced measurement error. By doing this exercise with the individual data, we are essentially 
purging the issue of omitted spatial variable bias and isolating bias due to ignoring voter 
selection.  
 Figure 5 plots the distribution of the coefficients with induced mismeasurement for a 
subset of variables, as well as the point estimates of the individual exit poll and aggregate 
precinct models from Table 2 for reference.14 In four of the six variables displayed, the 
distribution moves towards the aggregate coefficient and away from individual coefficient. The 
largest shift is seen for high school or less education, which has a mean about halfway between 
the individual and aggregate coefficients. It is intuitive that we see the largest shift with this 
                                                          
14 Table A4 in the online appendix provides means and distribution statistics for all coefficients in the model. 
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variable as it had the largest difference between exit poll sample and general population. Even 
the coefficient on voting for Hillary Clinton shifts towards the aggregate coefficient, and there 
was no reassignment of presidential votes, so this shift comes entirely from reassignment of 
other variables. This figure also illustrates how the systematic mismeasurement of the voting 
population differs from classical measurement error. Adding random noise to an independent 
variable causes attenuation bias in the coefficients. However, in two cases (Clinton, high school 
or less), the distribution of coefficients with induced measurement error shifts to be larger in 
magnitude.15 In sum, this figure shows that ignoring voter selection indeed accounts for some of 
the gap between the preference estimates of the exit poll and aggregate model.  
 We now attempt a solution to the mismeasurement problem of the aggregate model by 
adjusting demographics to reflect the selection process. We adjust all precinct-level Census 
variables such that the overall mean matches the individual exit poll means. For each 
characteristic, we calculate the ratio of individual exit poll mean to sampled precinct population 
mean (Column 3 divided by Column 2 in Table 1) and multiply the precinct values of the 
characteristic by that ratio. For example, for household income $30K or less, the factor is 
12.2/21.0 = 0.581, so a precinct with 30% of the population with high school or less education is 
adjusted to have an estimated 17.4% (=30*0.581) high school or less education among the voting 
population.  
Column 5 of Table 3 presents results after the demographic adjustment. The specification 
is identical to Column 2 of Table 3, the only difference is the adjustment, so Column 2 is the 
relevant comparison. The adjustment has little impact on coefficients on presidential votes. 
However, the adjustment does impact coefficient magnitudes on socioeconomic characteristics, 
though coefficient sign never changes. The coefficients on homeowner, household income $50-
74K, college graduate, and age 65 or over become slightly smaller in magnitude. Some changes 
are larger though; the coefficient on household income $30K or less nearly doubles in 
magnitude, and the coefficient on education high school or less nearly triples. While covariate 
adjustment clearly affects coefficients, more often than not the coefficients move further from 
the individual exit poll coefficients, rather than closer. Even with adjustments to demographics, 
                                                          
15 In other cases it is not possible to distinguish shifts in the distribution from attenuation because the aggregate 
coefficient is either smaller in magnitude or a different sign than the individual coefficient. 
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the aggregate model still relies solely on between-precinct variation, which we argue 
incapacitates the aggregate model from generating unbiased estimates.16  
 
4.3  Impact of bias on valuation and distributional impact estimates 
In the previous several pages, we have established that aggregate model coefficients are 
biased and the reasons for that bias. This result by itself indicates that regression estimates using 
aggregate data give an incorrect assessment of various groups’ propensity to vote for or against a 
given referendums. However, in addition to estimating willingness to vote, referendum outcomes 
can be used to estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for the proposed amenities or services (e.g., 
Vossler and Kerkvliet 2003, Burkhardt and Chan 2017). These WTP estimates can then be used 
in cost-benefit analysis to assess the efficiency and distributional implications of a policy, or for 
predicting the distribution of benefits of future spending. In this section we explore how the data 
type can influence WTP estimates.  
 Following referendum-style contingent valuation methods (Hanemann 1984, 1989), cost 
of the referendum must be included as an independent variable in the regression in order to 
derive WTP (Burkhardt and Chan 2017). The GEB will be paid for through general revenue, 
which is primarily income and sales taxes. We approximate household cost of GEB based on 
Rhode Island specific incidence of state income and sales taxes by income group from the 
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy [ITEP] (2018).17 We calculate that the cost of GEB 
for a household with the median income of $61,000 is about $82.03, and cost increases on 
average $12.07 for every $10,000 of additional income. Because estimated cost is highly 
collinear with income and homeowner status, these variables are excluded from the regression. 
Due to these necessary changes in the voter choice model, our WTP estimates are purely meant 
to illustrate possible disparities in estimates across data sources.18  
                                                          
16 In the online appendix, we estimate a voter participation model using aggregate data, presented in Table A5. In 
addition to the strategy of adjusting precinct demographic levels shown in Table 3, we additionally adjust means 
using estimated propensities for different groups to vote. Neither this approach, nor including residuals from the 
participation model, nor including participation levels has a substantial impact on the aggregate model voter 
preference estimates. This reinforces our belief that a bias-correction solution exists for the aggregate model.   
17 While state income tax rates are progressive, the incidence of sales taxes is regressive. ITEP (2018) calculates on 
net that state taxes are regressive, with the bottom quintile of the income distribution paying 6.5% of income in taxes 
and the top quintile paying about 5.2%.  
18 Referendum-style contingent valuation surveys randomize hypothetical cost, and thus cost is orthogonal to 
income, which obviates this issue.  
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 Table 5 presents estimated WTP for the aggregate and individual models, as well as the 
deviation from average WTP for various groups, which also represents the distribution of 
benefits from GEB passage.19 The estimated WTP using aggregate precincts is $848, which is 
2.6 times larger than the estimate using the individual exit poll ($323). The standard error in the 
aggregate model is large however, and the aggregate model does not reject the point estimate 
from the individual model. The individual model is more precisely estimated. In terms of the 
estimated distribution of benefits, often the models agree about which groups benefit more, but 
the magnitude can be different. Both models agree that Democrats have a larger WTP, but the 
estimated spread between Democrats and Republicans is about 67% larger for the aggregate 
model than the individual model, suggesting larger partisan divides in valuation than actually 
exist. Further, the aggregate model indicates that Republicans are actually harmed by GEB 
environmental improvements (WTP=-$432), whereas the individual model indicates that 
Republicans still value the improvements, just much less than average (WTP=$38). For age 
groups, the models agree on sign, but the aggregate model indicates a larger negative deviation 
for the old than the positive deviation for the young, but the individual model estimates that the 
deviation for the young is greater than that for the old. The most meaningful difference in models 
is for estimated benefit distributions between education groups. While the aggregate model 
suggests those with high school education or less have a higher WTP than those with a graduate 
degree, the individual model estimates the opposite and indicates a larger spread in WTP 
between these groups. The models also disagree about the distribution of benefits between racial 
and ethnic groups, with the aggregate model finding that Hispanics and Blacks benefit less than 
whites, whereas the individual model finds the opposite.  
Returning to the initial motivation for estimating WTP and distributional impacts, Table 
5 illustrates that using aggregate data could lead to incorrect assessment of efficiency and equity 
of a proposed or actual referendum, and thus an inefficient provision of public goods. For 
example, if a government is interested in creating environmental policy to address or at least 
consider racial injustice, the aggregate analysis may steer them away from spending similar to 
                                                          
19 Table A6 in the online appendix provides regression results used to estimate WTP. Linear models are used similar 
to Table 2. In order to calculate WTP, we modify the Hanemann’s (1984, 1989) logit formula for use with LPM. 
Average WTP is calculated as (𝛼𝛼� + 𝑿𝑿�𝜷𝜷� − 0.5)/(−𝛾𝛾�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖), where 𝛼𝛼� and 𝜷𝜷� come from the regression, 𝑿𝑿� is the mean 
of all independent variables (other than cost) included in the regression, and 𝛾𝛾�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  is the estimated coefficient on 
cost. Distributional impacts are calculated by conditioning on specific values to 𝑿𝑿 instead of sample means. WTP 
estimates derived from logit models and the standard Hanemann equation are near identical.  
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GEB priorities. To be clear, it is not always the case that the aggregate model will overestimate 
WTP or underestimate differential benefits for minorities, these result are specific to this context. 
But given the biases that the aggregate model possesses, it is quite likely that WTP and 
distributional conclusions will be wrong in other contexts.   
  
5  CONCLUSIONS 
 Understanding voter preferences and valuation of public goods and the distributional 
consequences of referendums are critical research areas. Many papers have developed revealed 
preference models that use publicly available aggregated votes matched with Census 
demographic data to address this research need. In this paper, we explore two potential sources 
of bias of the aggregate data approach, omitted spatial variables and ignoring voter selection, and 
then examine these sources through both a Monte Carlo simulation and a case study involving an 
actual statewide referendum.  
In the simulation, we are able to cleanly confirm that both potential sources of bias do 
indeed lead to biased preference estimates when aggregate data are used. With only one source 
of bias present, the sign of bias is known. However, with both sources present, which is the case 
in real-world applications, the sign of bias in unknown. In addition to the aggregate data, we also 
model a hypothetical exit poll that gathers individual level information on a small subset of 
voters. The exit poll only samples from the voting population, so avoids one source of bias, and 
can rely on within-precinct variation to mitigate bias from omitted spatial variables. Even in the 
presence of exit poll participation selection issues, the exit poll is always less biased than the 
aggregate model, and typically unbiased under realistic parameters.  
In the case study of a Rhode Island statewide environmental bond referendum, we mimic 
prior research and match aggregated, official votes to Census data at the precinct level and 
additionally undertake an extensive, statewide exit poll that is used for comparison. Results 
demonstrate large differences between preference estimates based on aggregate data and those 
based on exit polls, which we interpret as biased aggregate coefficients. While we cannot cleanly 
separate sources of bias, we perform additional tests that indicate both spatial omitted variables 
and ignoring voter selection lead to bias in the aggregate model. Lastly, we demonstrate that 
aggregate data produce an invalid assessment of valuation and distributional impacts.  
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The conclusion of this paper is that analysis of aggregate voting data matched with 
Census data is unlikely to yield unbiased voter preference estimates, and should be used only 
with this caveat. However, our results identify conditions when bias will likely be strongest, 
which can help future studies. For analysis of statewide referendums, states that are larger or 
more heterogeneous in terms of demographics and economy may have more unobserved 
determinants of approval, and hence aggregate data would be more susceptible to bias. California 
falls into this category and has been the focus of many studies due to the availability of data and 
the prevalence of referendums (e.g., Wu and Cutter 2011, Holian and Kahn 2015, Burkhardt and 
Chan 2017). Other research has compared votes on similar referendums across municipalities 
throughout the United States (e.g., Kotchen and Powers 2006, Banzhaf et al. 2010). One concern 
with this strategy is that local referendums are more likely than statewide referendums to be held 
in off-cycle (non-November) elections, which typically means even lower voter turnout.20 This 
in turn suggests voter selection forces may be stronger and disparities between the voting 
population and general population may be larger, which would increase bias when using 
aggregate data. Thus, analyzing voter preferences on a single citywide or statewide referendum 
in a small homogenous city or state held during a presidential election is when aggregate data 
will have the least bias. However, these are the conditions of our case study in Rhode Island, and 
bias is still substantial.  
 While we are pessimistic about the prospects of standard aggregate voting analysis, this 
paper presents the exit poll as a viable alternative. We have demonstrated that this method can be 
operationalized to cover an area the size of most MSAs and do so for a low monetary cost. We 
hope that others apply this method in other states and other referendums to replicate our findings 
and address important questions of voter behavior and political economy. However, given the 
broader use of early and mail-in voting, greatly accelerated by COVID-19, exit polls may 
become less viable. Other individual-level surveys by telephone, mail, or internet, are still 
feasible and commonly used in valuation settings.  
                                                          
20 According to the Land Vote Database, which is the data source for several studies on voter preferences for land 
conservation, only 22.3% of municipal referendums are held on presidential general election days, 20.2% are held 
on midterm election days, and 57.5% are held at other times. While about 55-60% of the voting age population 
(VAP) participate in presidential elections, midterm elections typically draw 10-15% less and only 25% or less of 
the VAP may participate in local elections (Hajnal and Lewis 2003). Thus, mismeasurement bias is likely worst for 
off-cycle municipal elections.  
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Future methods may be developed, perhaps using big data or machine learning, to 
mitigate bias in aggregate models. Ghitza and Gelman (2018) develop a methodology that 
combines telephone surveys and voter registration databases to predict presidential and 
congressional votes for individuals. While promising, this is not a method for aggregate data 
alone, the survey is the workhorse for prediction, which suggests there is a fundamental necessity 
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Figure 1: Effect of spatial omitted variable and within precinct variation on coefficient bias 
 
Notes: Results come from Monte Carlo simulation described in text. Vertical axis is the difference between the 
unbiased estimate and the estimate derived from either the aggregate data or exit poll data. Horizontal axis is 
different values of parameter 𝜌𝜌; negative (positive) values represent a negative (positive) correlation between a 
spatial omitted variable and the variable of interest, 𝑥𝑥. For the left plot, mean 𝜔𝜔 is 95.7% (sd=0.81), and for the right 
plot, mean 𝜔𝜔 is 79.9% (sd=1.21). Other parameters are set as follows: 𝑁𝑁 = 250,000, 𝐽𝐽 = 500, 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 = 500, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.1, 
𝜋𝜋1 = 0.5, 𝜋𝜋2 = 0.05, 𝛽𝛽 = 1, 𝜎𝜎 = 2, 𝜇𝜇 = 0.2, 𝜃𝜃1 = 0 and 𝜃𝜃2 = 0. Box plot boundaries indicate 25th-75th percentile 
with the middle line being the median and the whiskers are the 5th and 95th percentiles. The mean of the unbiased 
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Figure 2: Effect of selection into voting on coefficient bias 
 
Notes: Results come from Monte Carlo simulation described in text. Vertical axis is the difference between the 
unbiased estimate and the estimate derived from either the aggregate data or exit poll data. The left plot sets 𝜃𝜃1 =
−0.2, and the right plot sets 𝜃𝜃1 = 0.2. Box plot boundaries indicate 25th-75th percentile with the middle line being 
the median and the whiskers are the 5th and 95th percentiles.  The mean of the unbiased estimates is 0.176. Other 
parameters are set as follows: 𝑁𝑁 = 250,000, 𝐽𝐽 = 500, 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 = 500, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.1, 𝜋𝜋1 = 0.5, 𝜋𝜋2 = 0.05, 𝜃𝜃2 = 0, 𝛽𝛽 = 1, 
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Notes: Results come from Monte Carlo simulation described in text. Vertical axis is the difference between unbiased 
estimate and the estimate derived from the aggregate model. The left plot sets 𝜇𝜇 = 0.2, and the right plot sets 𝜇𝜇 =
0.8. Box plot boundaries indicate 25th-75th percentile with the middle line being the median and the whiskers are the 
5th and 95th percentiles. The mean of the unbiased estimates is 0.176. Other parameters are set as follows: 𝑁𝑁 =


















































Notes: Results come from Monte Carlo simulation described in text. Vertical axis is the difference between the 
unbiased estimate and the estimate derived from the exit poll model. Horizontal axis is different values of 𝜃𝜃2, with 
𝜃𝜃2 > 0 implying 𝑥𝑥 = 1 more likely to participate in the exit poll. Box plot boundaries indicate 25th-75th percentile 
with the middle line being the median and the whiskers are the 5th and 95th percentiles. The mean of the unbiased 
estimates is 0.176. Other parameters are set as follows: 𝑁𝑁 = 250,000, 𝐽𝐽 = 500, 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 = 500, 𝜋𝜋1 = 0.5, 𝜋𝜋2 = 0.05, 
















Figure 5: Distribution of individual exit poll estimated coefficients when socioeconomic 
characteristics are randomly re-assigned to match population proportions 
 
Notes: Socioeconomic characteristics of exit poll participants are randomly and iteratively changed from groups that 
are disproportionately more likely to vote relative to their population to groups that are disproportionately less likely 
to vote. Main specification is estimated on re-assigned sample and coefficients recorded. Process is repeated 200 
times to estimate distribution of coefficients with mismeasured population characteristics. Aggregate precinct and 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for aggregate data and exit poll 



















Voted in favor of Green Economy Bonds (GEB) 67.6 66.3  66.3 0.0 92.7 
Voted for Hillary Clinton 54.1 52.7  52.7 0.0 90.6 
Voted for Donald Trump 39.2 40.3  40.3 0.0 90.6 
Voted for Gary Johnson 3.2 3.4  3.4 0.0 98.3 
Voted for Jill Stein 1.3 1.4  1.4 0.0 98.6 
Voted for other presidential candidate 2.2 2.2  2.2 0.0 98.9 
Homeowner 67.3 70.2  73.2 3 86.3 
Female 52.2 51.1  52.6 1.5 97.2 
Hispanic or Black 18.8 15.8  10.7 -5.1*** 75.6 
Age 18 to 29 19.3 18.2  13.3 -4.9*** 95.8 
Age 30 to 44 22.0 21.2  21.9 0.7 96.6 
Age 45 to 54 18.4 19.2  22.5 3.3*** 96.1 
Age 55 to 64 18.4 18.9  22.3 3.4*** 97.7 
Age 65 or over 21.9 22.5  20.0 -2.5** 95.3 
Household income less than $30K 22.3 21.0  12.2 -8.8*** 91.7 
Household income $30-49K 14.9 14.8  15.8 1 97.7 
Household income $50-74K 16.0 14.7  21.6 6.9*** 97.3 
Household income $75-99K 13.5 13.7  16.7 3** 97.6 
Household income over $100K 33.3 35.8  33.7 -2.1 89.7 
Education level is high school or less 37.2 35.1  13.3 -21.8*** 96.3 
Education level is some college 26.4 26.7  27.7 1 97.0 
Education level is college graduate 21.5 22.7  34.4 11.7*** 97.5 
Education level is graduate degree 14.9 15.5  24.7 9.2*** 95.0        
Observations (Precincts, Individuals) 416 37   2033     
Notes: For Columns 1 and 2, weighted means are displayed with precincts weighted by the total number of GEB votes. For Column 3, weighted means are 
displayed with individuals weighted by their sampling weight, which is determined by GEB and presidential vote (described in the main text). Column 4 presents 
differences in means and statistical significance of differences (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Statistical significance is determined using margin of error 
calculations by the American Community Survey and the standard error from the survey mean. Column 5 is calculated as 1-R-squared, with the R-squared coming 
from a weighted regression of each variable on precinct fixed effects.  
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Table 2: Determinants of voting in favor of Green Economy Bonds using different data sources 
Variables 
% of precinct (column 1) or 
binary (column 2) 
Aggregate  
precincts 
 Individual  
exit poll 
(1)   (2) 
Voted for Hillary Clinton 0.510***  0.385*** 
 (0.021)  (0.031) 
Voted for Gary Johnson 0.461**  0.032 
 (0.179)  (0.063) 
Voted for Jill Stein 1.211***  0.156* 
 (0.252)  (0.090) 
Voted for other presidential candidate 0.148  0.135* 
 (0.189)  (0.074) 
Homeowner -0.063***  -0.122*** 
 (0.017)  (0.031) 
Female 0.059**  0.033* 
 (0.028)  (0.018) 
Hispanic or Black -0.007  -0.038 
 (0.010)  (0.044) 
Age 18 to 29 0.001  0.013 
 (0.024)  (0.040) 
Age 45 to 54 0.036  -0.019 
 (0.042)  (0.031) 
Age 55 to 64 0.046  -0.014 
 (0.038)  (0.034) 
Age 65 or over -0.079**  -0.023 
 (0.032)  (0.035) 
Household income less than $30K -0.059**  0.054 
 (0.027)  (0.043) 
Household income $30-49K -0.046*  -0.020 
 (0.027)  (0.044) 
Household income $50-74K -0.054**  -0.000 
 (0.027)  (0.029) 
Household income $75-99K 0.003  0.023 
 (0.037)  (0.028) 
Education level is high school or less 0.062**  0.008 
 (0.029)  (0.040) 
Education level is college graduate 0.073**  0.027 
 (0.032)  (0.031) 
Education level is graduate degree 0.035  0.094** 
 (0.030)  (0.040)     
R-squared 0.926  0.234 
Observations (Precincts, Individuals) 416   2,033 
Notes: For Column 1, the unit of observation is precinct, the dependent variable is the proportion voting in 
favor of GEB, and observations are weighted by the total number of GEB votes. For Column 2, the unit of 
observation is the individual, the dependent variable is a binary indicator of voting in favor of GEB, and 
observations are weighted by their sampling weight, which is determined by GEB and presidential vote 
(described in the main text). Both columns are estimated using OLS. Additional control variables (measured at 
the precinct level) not displayed are: population density, residential property tax rate, average house sales 
price, distance to existing bike path, open space acres previously preserved by state funds, and number of 
remediated brownfields. Robust standard errors are used in Column 1, and precinct-clustered standard errors 
are used in Column 2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
36 
Table 3: Additional specifications for aggregate model 
Variables (% of precinct) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Voted for Hillary Clinton 0.528*** 0.510*** 0.539*** 0.533*** 0.514*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) 
Voted for Gary Johnson 0.382** 0.461** 0.613*** 0.565*** 0.566*** 
 (0.169) (0.179) (0.181) (0.184) (0.184) 
Voted for Jill Stein 1.190*** 1.211*** 1.503*** 1.446*** 1.194*** 
 (0.253) (0.252) (0.271) (0.276) (0.259) 
Voted for other presidential candidate 0.074 0.148 0.419** 0.431** 0.109 
 (0.183) (0.189) (0.172) (0.172) (0.193) 
Homeowner -0.055*** -0.063*** -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.053*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Female 0.066** 0.059** 0.029 0.028 0.050 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.032) 
Hispanic or Black -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) 
Age 18 to 29 -0.008 0.001 0.018 0.017 0.004 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.031) 
Age 45 to 54 0.013 0.036 0.034 0.030 0.016 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.040) (0.039) (0.034) 
Age 55 to 64 0.015 0.046 0.063 0.066* 0.024 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.030) 
Age 65 or over -0.103*** -0.079** -0.050* -0.050* -0.078** 
 (0.028) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.034) 
Household income less than $30K -0.044* -0.059** -0.011 -0.012 -0.113** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.048) 
Household income $30-49K -0.033 -0.046* -0.029 -0.024 -0.026 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
Household income $50-74K -0.040 -0.054** -0.010 -0.004 -0.052*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.019) 
Household income $75-99K 0.019 0.003 -0.011 -0.015 -0.020 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
Education level is high school or less 0.065** 0.062** 0.019 0.014 0.169** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.083) 
Education level is college graduate 0.065** 0.073** 0.027 0.025 0.053*** 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.020) 
Education level is graduate degree 0.030 0.035 0.015 0.016 0.015 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.020)       
Precinct characteristics  yes yes yes yes 
Town fixed effects   yes yes  
Latitude/Longitude controls    yes  
Adjusted Demographics     yes       
R-squared 0.924 0.926 0.949 0.950 0.925 
Notes: For all columns, the unit of observation is precinct, the dependent variable is the proportion voting in 
favor of GEB, observations are weighted by the total number of GEB votes, models are estimated using OLS, and 
the sample size is 416. Precinct characteristics are: population density, residential property tax rate, average 
house sales price, distance to existing bike path, open space acres previously preserved by state funds, and 
number of remediated brownfields. Latitude/Longitude controls are quadratic functions of latitude and longitude 
and the interaction of latitude and longitude. For Column 5, census demographics are adjusted proportionately for 
each precinct so that the aggregate sample means are identical to those of the exit poll. Robust standard errors are 
used. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Additional specifications for individual model  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Voted for Hillary Clinton 0.397*** 0.385*** 0.391*** 0.390*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Voted for Gary Johnson 0.035 0.032 0.043 0.041 
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
Voted for Jill Stein 0.164* 0.156* 0.168* 0.166* 
 (0.091) (0.090) (0.095) (0.095) 
Voted for other presidential candidate 0.142* 0.135* 0.129 0.130 
 (0.075) (0.074) (0.077) (0.077) 
Homeowner -0.134*** -0.122*** -0.111*** -0.109*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) 
Female 0.031* 0.033* 0.031 0.030 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
Hispanic or Black -0.014 -0.038 -0.034 -0.038 
 (0.039) (0.044) (0.045) (0.047) 
Age 18 to 29 0.006 0.013 0.007 0.009 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
Age 45 to 54 -0.023 -0.019 -0.016 -0.017 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Age 55 to 64 -0.019 -0.014 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
Age 65 or over -0.028 -0.023 -0.020 -0.021 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
Household income less than $30K 0.064 0.054 0.058 0.056 
 (0.040) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
Household income $30-49K -0.014 -0.020 -0.007 -0.009 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Household income $50-74K 0.006 -0.000 0.002 0.000 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Household income $75-99K 0.030 0.023 0.025 0.023 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) 
Education level is high school or less 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.005 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
Education level is college graduate 0.026 0.027 0.022 0.020 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Education level is graduate degree 0.092** 0.094** 0.089** 0.088** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)      
Precinct characteristics  yes yes  
Town fixed effects   yes  
Precinct fixed effects    yes      
R-squared 0.227 0.234 0.254 0.257 
Notes: For all columns, the unit of observation is the individual, the sample size is 2033, the dependent variable is a 
binary indicator of voting in favor of GEB, observations are weighted by their sampling weight, which is 
determined by GEB and presidential vote (described in the main text), and models are estimated using OLS. 
Precinct characteristics are: population density, residential property tax rate, average house sales price, distance to 
existing bike path, open space acres previously preserved by state funds, and number of remediated brownfields. 












Table 5: Estimated willingness to pay for GEB and the distribution of benefits 
    Aggregate precincts   
Individual  
exit poll 
Estimated willingness to pay (WTP) ($) 848  323 
  (425)  (77) 
     
Deviation from average WTP for various groups 
 Democrat 128%  79% 
 Republican -151%  -88% 
 Hispanic or Black -10%  2% 
 White 2%  0% 
 Female 12%  5% 
 Male -13%  -6% 
 Age 29 or under 13%  32% 
 Age 65 or over -54%  -17% 
 Education level is high school or less 6%  -10% 
 Education level is graduate degree -6%   26% 
Notes: Regression models that enter into WTP calculation are presented in Appendix 
Table A7. Standard errors of estimated WTP are calculated using the delta method and 
are shown in parentheses.  
 
 
 
